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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines two views of conscience: an
understanding that conscience is directed towards a shared end
and judged by those ends; and an understanding that conscience
entails the individual’s freedom to pursue self-determined ends.
I call these “inter-subjective conscience” and “ethical freedom
conscience.” Both views are found within Christian religious liberty
discourse. Both are part of a response to what Christopher
McCrudden calls the “teleological problem”: What is religious
liberty for? What does it protect?1
Perhaps the dominant understanding of religious liberty is that
it serves personal autonomy. Courts have typically agreed with the
Supreme Court of Canada, emphasizing that religious liberty centers
on “the notion of personal choice and individual autonomy and

 Senior Lecturer, Sydney Law School, University of Sydney. My thanks to
Frederick M. Gedicks, Nicholas Aroney, Andrea Pin, and Dmytro Vovk for comments on a
draft of this Article.
1. CHRISTOPHER MCCRUDDEN, LITIGATING RELIGIONS: AN ESSAY ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
COURTS, AND BELIEFS, at ix (2018).
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freedom.”2 A number of influential commentators have amplified
this understanding.3 For example, Ronald Dworkin considers that
religious liberty should be reconceived as a more fundamental
commitment to “ethical freedom.”4 This fits with his understanding
of political authority. It exists to respect a person’s authenticity, the
capacity to identify and pursue a way of life that “grips you as right
for you.”5 Accounts like this, whether they refer to authenticity or,
for example, deep commitments or convictions, ask why a
particular “religion” (say, Christian, Muslim, Jewish) should be
treated with special concern. Such religions are now part of the
general milieu of commitments, meaning they should equally be
subject to the state’s law, or else most likely outweighed by the
significant interests proposed by the law.
Christian religious liberty discourse has responded to these
claims, but in different ways. Generally, an attempt is made to
articulate a goal or purpose that religious liberty is directed
towards that is more defined than capacious appeals to versions of
personal autonomy. This is seen in arguments grounding religious
liberty in a more institutional or social account.6 I do not discuss
such arguments in this Article, although it will be clear that the two
accounts of conscience discussed can interact with such social
or institutional accounts differently. My focus is on conscience,
which broadly concerns the claims of individuals. In Part II,
I discuss inter-subjective conscience. This view contains two claims,
I will argue: first, that conscience should not be coerced, not
because of ethical independence, but because of the end to which
religion or conscience is directed; second, that conscience
ultimately serves (and its exercise is judged by its consistency with)
a social end. I will then address a critical argument in response: that
the inter-subjective account of conscience is inconsistent with
pluralism. In Part III, I discuss ethical freedom conscience. This
2. Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, para. 40 (Can.).
3. See JOEL HARRISON, POST-LIBERAL RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: FORMING COMMUNITIES OF
CHARITY 25–58 (2020).
4. RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD 132 (2013) [hereinafter DWORKIN,
RELIGION WITHOUT GOD]; RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR
A NEW POLITICAL DEBATE 61 (2006) [hereinafter DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?].
5. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 203–09 (2011) [hereinafter DWORKIN,
JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS].
6. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”: (Towards) an Exposition,
Translation, and Defense, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 33 (2013); HARRISON, supra note 3,
at 142–82.
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understanding of conscience is first grounded on the claim that the
individual must follow God’s commands, as he or she discerns such
commands, but it then concludes with a wider vision of respecting
ethical freedom—the individual’s capacity to determine his or her
own ends. I discuss Kathleen Brady’s recent arguments for natural
religion as an example of how this trajectory can unfold.7 I argue
that it creates a question: What is the boundary of conscience
claims? I then conclude by considering how this understanding
of conscience is embedded within a vision of political community
and the purpose of political authority, one that contrasts the
inter-subjective view of conscience.
For some, conscience is a category separate from religious
belief. It may concern a person’s convictions seen as wholly based
on an immanent ethic, for example.8 International law refers to
protecting “thought, conscience and religion,” imparting an
understanding that these are separate categories.9 However, I am
not concerned with attempting to uncouple conscience and religion
in this way. In fact, I think it is difficult to articulate a non-religious
view of conscience as wholly uncoupled from religious concerns
and history.10 This is illustrated by the discussion of ethical freedom
conscience in Part III—such a view, although ending with a
more capacious appeal to individual ethics, is at least marked by
antecedent theological claims. Rather, the debate here is between
two different understandings of “religious conscience,” to borrow
from Brady:11 conscience that finds its end in God (as with the
7. See text accompanying infra notes 71–96, discussing KATHLEEN BRADY, THE
DISTINCTIVENESS OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN LAW (2015).
8. See, e.g., JOCELYN MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND FREEDOM OF
CONSCIENCE 90 (Jane Marie Todd trans., 2011) (arguing that freedom of religion is one
category within freedom of conscience); BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 63–64
(2013) (arguing that conscience, rather than religion, is a subject of potential toleration,
with religion defined by categoricity of commands, insulation from evidence, and
existential consolation).
9. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 9(1), Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5.
10. This argument is developed in HARRISON, supra note 3, at 59–99. Liberal egalitarian
accounts of religion—focusing on convictions of conscience or authenticity, for example—
are not substitutes for religion, but arise from a half-concealed theology. Id.; see also CHARLES
TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 257 (2007) (discussing the shift, theological in provenance, towards
a “disengaged, disciplined agent, capable of remaking the self . . . [as] one of the crucial
supports of modern exclusive humanism”).
11. As I discuss below, Brady hopes to distinguish this from “secular conscience.” See
text accompanying infra notes 73–81. However, I argue that her understanding of conscience
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inter-subjective account of conscience) or conscience that finds its
end in something that the individual alights upon in the pursuit of
individual authenticity or self-determination (as with the ethical
freedom account of conscience).
My focus is on “Christian religious liberty discourse.”
Undoubtedly, that category presents a boundary question: Who is
“in” and who is “out” of this conversation? I do not offer a
definition or a threshold requirement. Rather, I discuss writers who
consciously see themselves as drawing from Christian thought or
in dialogue with it, with particular reference to claims of
conscience. Further, I do not claim to be exhaustive. Notably, I only
discuss a selection of Western sources—arguments rooted in
Western European and North American sources and figures, albeit
sources and figures that have often had a wider influence. This
means I am largely only considering elements of Catholic and
Protestant thought; I am not considering how this maps onto
Orthodox claims, for example.12 Nevertheless, my intention is to
sketch what I argue is one important debate within Christian
religious liberty discourse.
II. INTER-SUBJECTIVE CONSCIENCE
The inter-subjective understanding of conscience contains two
claims. First, conscience cannot be coerced because such coercion
is inconsistent with the purpose of conscience (indeed, the end of
the person)—the free offering of the person back to a God who is
revealed as love. Second, claims of conscience are ultimately a
social matter, developed and considered within a community and
judged by the shared end to which they are ultimately directed.
On this basis, conscience is “inter-subjective” because it entails
communal discernment and a relationship to another subject, a
person’s own end—God.
A. Against Coercing Conscience
Why is coercing religious belief wrong? For a liberal writer like
Dworkin, it is contrary to a principle of neutrality. If a political
(an understanding shared with others) makes this increasingly difficult. See text accompanying
infra notes 82–96.
12. For a discussion of the Russian Orthodox Church, human dignity, freedom, and
rights, see Mark L. Movsesian, Of Human Dignities, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1517, 1524–25,
1529–30, 1536–39 (2016).
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authority attempted to demand a person adhere to a religion, this
would be inconsistent with equal concern and respect. The person’s
authenticity, or freedom to pursue what grips him or her as right,
would be infringed, and it is the role of political authority to respect
such ethical independence.13 In Christian religious liberty
discourse, different writers typically agree that political authority
must not coerce persons into the faith.14 However, this argument is
more likely to be grounded on an understanding of what
conscience is directed towards.
Dignitatis Humanae, the Second Vatican Council’s Declaration
on Religious Liberty, states that conscience is not rooted in the
“subjective disposition of the person.”15 Rather, it grounds
conscience in the person’s natural desire or inclination to know the
truth about God, a God who the Declaration affirms has reached
down to persons and revealed himself as their end. Conscience is
thus said to be directed towards the worship of God, “the end and
purpose of life.”16 This can be characterized as a principle of
subject-centering or subjectivity, but not of personal autonomy as
it is typically understood in religious liberty literature.
On this argument, coercion into the faith would defeat its very
nature; indeed, it would be contrary to the nature of truth. Dignitatis
Humanae affirms as true that God’s nature is to love and to desire
nothing less than love. But this is understood as the free offering of
the entire person, a desire that the subject, the person, comes to
understand himself or herself as destined for God and as receiving
his or her entire, unique being from God. On this basis, John Finnis
writes that coercion is a wrong because it renders the person’s
search for truth—that free offering of oneself—inauthentic.17
13. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 209 (1985); DWORKIN,
RELIGION WITHOUT GOD, supra note 4, at 130; DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 5,
at 203–09.
14. This is distinguished from another debate within Roman Catholic discourse,
namely whether the Church has coercive authority over the baptized. See Thomas Pink, The
Right to Religious Liberty and the Coercion of Belief: A Note on Dignitatis Humanae, in REASON,
MORALITY, AND LAW: THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN FINNIS 427 (John Keown & Robert P. George
eds., 2013).
15. POPE PAUL VI, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: DIGNITATIS HUMANAE § 2
(Dec. 7, 1965) [hereinafter POPE PAUL VI, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE], http://www.vatican.va
/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatishumanae_en.html.
16. Id. § 3.
17. 5 JOHN FINNIS, Religion and Public Life in a Pluralist Society, in RELIGION AND PUBLIC
REASONS: COLLECTED ESSAYS 42, 49 (2011).

1277

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

46:5 (2021)

Moreover, as John Milbank notes, if the truth about God consists in
love and a free offering in return, then coercion always risks
distorting that truth— it presents the possibility that a person
associates the truth of God with pain and violence.18 Consequently,
coercion is wrong—giving rise to a duty on the part of authorities
not to commit that wrong—because conscience is understood as the
site of persuasion towards this true end.19
These contentions are not novel and, generally, a prohibition on
coercion is affirmed within Christian religious liberty discourse.
Recently, Robert Louis Wilken has contended that arguments of
this nature have been fundamental to Christian claims of liberty
since the patristic period. He opens his book on “the Christian
origins of religious freedom” with the following: “Religious freedom
rests on a simple truth: religious faith is an inward disposition of
the mind and heart and for that reason cannot be coerced by
external force.”20 He then begins to substantiate this claim with an
appeal back to Tertullian, the second century Christian apologist
who argued against punishing Christians for failing to worship the
Roman gods.21 Tertullian, Wilken notes, argued for “free choice
with respect to divine matters” against being “forced to worship
what I do not wish.” He continued, “Not even a human being
would like to be honored unwillingly.”22 Wilken summarizes:
“If the mind is not persuaded, religious acts are a mockery of
God.”23 It is easy to read into the words of Tertullian and others a
more modern claim—that conscience concerns individual
self-determination facilitated by a neutral civil authority. Indeed,
this is arguably the trajectory of Wilken’s Whig narrative, as I
discuss below. However, what is notable in the early claims of
Tertullian and others is that they are arguably entirely grounded
on a Christian argument as to the nature of true religion. Coercion
is a wrong not because it violates a sphere of personal choice at

18. JOHN MILBANK, THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY: BEYOND SECULAR REASON 411–26
(2d ed. 2006).
19. POPE PAUL VI, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 15, § 3.
20. ROBERT LOUIS WILKEN, LIBERTY IN THE THINGS OF GOD: THE CHRISTIAN ORIGINS OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 1 (2019).
21. Id. at 10–13. The argument is then extended via other figures—for example,
Lactantius—a century later. See id. at 20.
22. Id. at 11.
23. Id. at 20.
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large, but because God desires that a person seeks him as the
subject of worship freely.24
Underlying this view, then, is a contention: that conscience is
directed towards a specific end. As Russell Hittinger emphasizes,
the claim that conscience cannot be coerced does not give rise to a
right of self-expressive autonomy. Coercion would be inconsistent
with the person freely offering himself or herself to God, but
conscience is nevertheless understood as the site where a person
fulfils the duty to respond to the truth about God. It entails
ultimately conforming to what Dignitatis Humanae calls “the
imperatives of the divine law.”25 David L. Schindler puts it this
way: “I have a right to be free from coercion because I am made for
truth and God, for the purpose of seeking the truth and God.”26 For
the inter-subjective view of conscience, this grounds a prohibition
on coercing a person into adopting faith in God.
However, the argument goes further. Claims of conscience may
entail a demand not to be coerced into a religious belief, but as
Tertullian and other early Christians argued, the claim of
conscience also entails individuals demanding the liberty to engage
in practices consistent with conscience—and perhaps inconsistent
with civil law. On the inter-subjective view, an understanding of
the end of conscience—that it is ultimately for and directed towards
“truth and God”—consequently also shapes when such a claim for
liberty of practice should be recognized by a civil authority.
Exploring this entails examining the social ends of conscience.
B. The Social Ends of Conscience
Traditionally, conscience was understood as the site where God
speaks.27 For example, Augustine emphasized the interiority of the
person as the place where God is most intimately heard; that
24. Wilken summarizes: “[O]nly in giving of ourselves do we revere God.” Id. at 21.
On Wilken’s account, these contentions can be found in many Reformers also. As I discuss
below, this is typically coupled with a claim as to the differentiation between matters of the
spirit, belonging to the individual before God, and matters of the body, belonging to the civil
authority. See, e.g., id. at 69–70 (discussing John Calvin).
25. Russell Hittinger, Dignitatis Humanae, Religious Liberty, and Ecclesiastical
Self-Government, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1035, 1046–48 (2000) (quoting POPE PAUL VI,
DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 15, § 3).
26. David L. Schindler, Freedom, Truth, and Human Dignity: An Interpretation of
Dignitatis Humanae on the Right to Religious Liberty, 40 COMMUNIO: INT’L CATHOLIC REV. 208,
287 (2013) (emphasis omitted).
27. See HARRISON, supra note 3, at 185–88.
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the person, in looking inward, may meet the “immaterial light
which casts as it were its rays upon our minds, to enable us to
come to a right judgement.”28 Such illumination is God speaking.
Oliver O’Donovan consequently characterizes conscience in patristic
writing more generally as “our self-opening to the probing
interrogation and challenge of an encounter with God.”29 Thomas
Aquinas continues in similar vein, although with a shift towards
greater rationalism. Conscience, he argued, entails applying the
natural law to new circumstances. Each person has knowledge of
the truth because God has implanted an inner faculty that inclines
them towards the good. He called this synderesis. Conscience was
then the further “application of [such] knowledge to something.”30
This gives rise to a creative tension in Aquinas’s writing. A person
is culpable for a wrong conscience; he or she could be judged for
misunderstanding the requirements of the natural law in a given
case. However, that person could also nevertheless understand that
conscience to be binding, being that person’s determination of what
God’s precepts required.31
In each case—whether patristic or medieval, Augustine or
Aquinas—the person turns inward. He or she turns towards the
illuminating light or else is committed to an act of reason reflecting
on the natural law. However, in both cases the person is
nevertheless also reaching externally, towards God. This has
important consequences. Although an act of the individual person,
conscience in this line of thought is intrinsically social. It is social
for several reasons.

28. AUGUSTINE, CONCERNING THE CITY OF GOD, AGAINST THE PAGANS bk. XI, at 461
(Henry Battenson trans., 2003). Gaudium et Spes states, “Conscience is the most secret core
and sanctuary of a man. There he is alone with God, Whose voice echoes in his depths.” POPE
PAUL VI, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD: GAUDIUM ET
SPES § 16 (Dec. 7, 1965), http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/
documents/vat-ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html.
29. OLIVER O’DONOVAN, THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT 305 (2005).
30. See THOMAS AQUINAS, ON CONSCIENCE. DISPUTED QUESTION ON TRUTH 17 (1256–
59), reprinted in THOMAS AQUINAS: SELECTED WRITINGS 217, 221 (Ralph McInerny ed. & trans.,
1998); see also Rex Ahdar, Is Freedom of Conscience Superior to Freedom of Religion?, 7 OXFORD
J.L. & RELIGION 124, 130 (2018).
31. AQUINAS, supra note 30, at 224–26. This echoes St. Paul who, as Robert K. Vischer
notes, understood conscience to include “a set of moral convictions that may misperceive
moral reality, but that nevertheless shape the person’s conduct.” ROBERT K. VISCHER,
CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN PERSON AND
STATE 52 (2010).
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First, Aquinas echoes St. Paul, who considered that conscience
concerned knowledge shared between persons, as well as a
self-awareness of God’s judgment.32 It consequently is subject to an
inter-subjective search for and application of truth.33 Indeed,
O’Donovan notes that even the conscientious individual who
dissents from society, as radical prophet or martyr, is still on this
view acting in order to communicate an understanding of a shared,
common good.34
Second, conscience consequently concerned shared deliberation
and shared practices; it could not be divorced from a community.
Indeed, as Wilken notes, claims of conscience or arguments against
coercive practices—whether patristic or Reformed on his account—
typically concerned not simply an individual, but the flourishing
of the community and its practices.35 In Catholic thought,
developing one’s conscience is said to take place necessarily
within a community. The community communicates its
understanding of God and develops the individual’s knowledge
through what Pope John Paul II called “the deeper capacity to
entrust oneself to others.”36 More recently, Pope Francis has warned
against reducing the religious life to the “quiet obscurity of the
individual’s conscience.”37
Third, and most fundamentally, conscience is social because for
this tradition of thinking it concerns a shared end—God. This is not
a generic or abstracted God, a placeholder for what may be the
32. See O’DONOVAN, supra note 29, at 303–04; VISCHER, supra note 31, at 50–52.
33. See VISCHER, supra note 31, at 3. Vischer argues, “There is a clear need to recapture
the relational dimension of conscience—the notion that the dictates of conscience are
defined, articulated, and lived out in relationship with others.” Id. On this basis, Vischer also
refers to conscience as “inter-subjective.” Id. at 9. He continues: “The moral convictions that
make up conscience connect the individual to something outside herself, to a perception of
self-transcendent reality. This outward orientation makes our moral claims uniquely
susceptible to social engagement and influence.” Id. at 45.
34. O’DONOVAN, supra note 29, at 310.
35. See WILKEN, supra note 20, at 12–13 (discussing Tertullian), 23 (discussing
Constantine), 112 (discussing the Reformed tradition).
36. See JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: FIDES ET RATIO § 32 (1998),
http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_
14091998_fides-et-ratio.html; POPE PAUL VI, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 15, § 3 (“The
inquiry is to be free, carried on with the aid of teaching or instruction, communication and
dialogue . . . .”).
37. POPE FRANCIS, APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION: EVANGELII GAUDIUM § 255 (2013)
[hereinafter POPE FRANCIS, EVANGELII GAUDIUM], https://w2.vatican.va/content/
francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20131124_
evangelii-gaudium.html.
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individual’s ultimate concern. God here is understood to be the
triune God revealed in Christ. This specificity means that any claim
of conscience could be subject to judgement as to its character.
The life of the conscientious individual responding to God should,
if truly conscientious, take on a particular shape, albeit one that is
creatively repeated through perpetual variety, potential difference,
and even surprise. Thus, Milbank argues that “all Christians
inherit Christ’s kingly power to judge, in equity, above and beyond
the law.” But this is coupled with an understanding of what
judging in equity means: “To be a king in Christ’s image must mean
that every Christian individual takes upon himself to ‘represent’
his neighbours by standing in active and atoning solidarity with
them . . . .”38 Indeed, in his speeches on religious liberty,
Pope Francis has tended to emphasize that religious liberty—and
the claim of conscience—can only truly be considered an act of
religion or conscience if it manifests right ends or fraternity and
love.39 This follows from an understanding of the end of
conscience—it is directed towards the God who is love. Francis
refers to an “authentic and mature living out of religious freedom,”
and has linked this with the “call to conversion, reconciliation,
concern for the future of society, self-sacrifice in the service of the
common good, and compassion for those in need.”40
C. Inter-Subjective Conscience and Pluralism
Such a view of conscience—as grounded in a shared end—
could be criticized as potentially leaving little space for the religious
liberty or the conscience claims of those who disagree. The
38. JOHN MILBANK, BEYOND SECULAR ORDER: THE REPRESENTATION OF BEING AND THE
REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE 249 (2013).
39. See Joel Harrison, Pope Francis, True Religion, and Religious Liberty, 33 J.L. &
RELIGION 447 (2018). This also reflects an emphasis on rights as necessarily serving a more
fundamental duty. For this emphasis in Catholic thought, see Christopher McCrudden, Legal
and Roman Catholic Conceptions of Human Rights: Convergence, Divergence and Dialogue?,
1 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 185, 193 (2012). For a similar claim in Protestant thought, see, e.g.,
The United Church Pronouncement on Human Rights, in MAX L. STACKHOUSE, CREEDS, SOCIETY,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS app. IV, at 296 (1984).
40. Pope Francis, Meeting with the Leaders of Other Religions and Other Christian
Denominations: Address of Pope Francis, VATICAN (Sept. 21, 2014), http://m2.vatican.va/
content/francesco/en/speeches/2014/september/documents/papa-francesco_20140921_
albania-leaders-altre-religioni.html; Pope Francis, Meeting for Religious Liberty with the
Hispanic Community and Other Immigrants: Address of Pope Francis, VATICAN (Sept. 26, 2015),
http://w2.vatican.va/content/Francesco/en/speeches/2015/september/documents/
papa-francesco_20150926_usa-liberta-religiosa.html.
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inter-subjective view affirms that a person cannot be coerced into
religious belief. However, even this is based on the argument
that conscience ultimately entails cohering to what is true. On this
view, conscience is directed towards God, and not just any God but
the triune God affirmed in Christianity. This then means that the
exercise of conscience is judged by its relationship to God. Such
judgement is social in the ways described. It entails communal
discernment. The individual does not decide alone, but is formed
by a community, and the act of conscience, rightly understood,
is directed towards a social end. Critics may contend that the
inter-subjective view of conscience consequently renders dissenting
claims or simply claims that are different (a different understanding
of God, for example) lamentable instances of “un-freedom” or the
wrong exercise of conscience.
For example, in his contribution to this volume, Frederick Mark
Gedicks argues that inevitable religious difference and moral
pluralism rules out appealing to Christian theological claims as the
basis for key political and legal concepts.41 He discusses dignity, but
the argument equally applies to related discussion of conscience.
On this view, such appeals impede “the formation of a stable
political consensus for human rights.”42 Gedicks raises the
possibility that appealing to a “thick” theological understanding of
conscience, like the inter-subjective view, renders the permissibility
of alternative claims, claims not rooted in Christian thought, into a
dispensation—such claims are judged against the central idea of
what conscience is for.43 He consequently writes, “It would seem
self-evident that a political consensus founded on Christian dignity
[or, as here, conscience] is unlikely to attract non-Christian and
unbelieving members in a pluralistic polity.”44
In this, Gedicks follows John Rawls. It was Rawls who
considered that under conditions of freedom, the presence of
equally reasonable comprehensive doctrines was inevitable.45 This

41. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Christian Dignity and the Overlapping Consensus, 46 BYU
L. REV. 1245 (2021).
42. Id. at 1245.
43. Gedicks rightly raised this point in commentary on my article in draft. I am
grateful to him for pressing the argument.
44. Gedicks, supra note 41, at 1260.
45. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133–35 (expanded ed., 2005) [hereinafter
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM]; see also JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in THE
LAW OF PEOPLES 129, 131 (1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, Public Reason Revisited].
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is the “fact of reasonable pluralism.”46 Others have echoed this
claim as to the inevitability of pluralism.47 For Rawls it meant that
the aspiration to consider whether a shared conception of the good
orders our political life, one in which our talents and roles
creatively participate, was an experiment in un-freedom. It was not
possible then, as Plato, Aristotle, and thinkers of Christendom had
argued, to pursue a common good, traditionally understood as
shaping the ends of political community; this must be abandoned
in favor of a conception of rights.48 Only such equal rights could
ground an overlapping consensus between reasonable conceptions
of the good; and only then would the exercise of political authority
be legitimate, as grounded on reasons acceptable to all reasonable
people.49 On this argument, to judge claims of conscience based on
a shared end—God, as discussed, and the character of conscience
this then precipitates—fails to account for pluralism. Gedicks
argues, in the context of dignity discourse, that it enacts
“repression” against those of different beliefs.50
Perhaps unsurprisingly, a discussion of conscience can quickly
lead to a discussion of pluralism and political authority. These
are, of course, complicated matters that have been debated for
some time. Here, I will only point towards why those advancing
the inter-subjective view of conscience would disagree with the
Rawlsian claims. They would disagree with at least two lines
of argument: (1) persuasion for political purposes is not possible,
leaving us with inevitable conflict to be overcome by putting
aside comprehensive claims; and (2) differences cannot be
accommodated within an appeal to an objective good or appeals to
Christian claims.
Gedicks argues that a Christian conception of dignity, and we
can assume of conscience, self-evidently will not attract the support
46. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 45, at 172.
47. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Religious Accommodations and—and Among—Civil
Rights: Separation, Toleration, and Accommodation, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 493, 503 (2015) (“My own
thinking . . . is pluralistic in the familiar sense that it accepts as given, unavoidable,
permanent, and human the fact that people, associations, institutions, and communities
reasonably disagree about things that matter.”).
48. Rawls writes that we cannot be “a community, where by a community I mean a
body of persons united in affirming the same comprehensive, or partially comprehensive,
doctrine.” JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 3 (2001).
49. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 45, at 217; see also RAWLS, Public
Reason Revisited, supra note 45, at 136–37.
50. Gedicks, supra note 41, at 1259.
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of others. It is not “likely to persuade most liberal Christians, nonChristians, or unbelievers of its preeminent claim.”51 He refers to
the existence of Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Indigenous persons,
Buddhists and others for the claim that a Christian conception lacks
persuasive purchase. But why should persuasion be ruled out in
advance in this way? There appears to be an a priori commitment
that persuasion for the sake of shaping the political community is
not in fact possible, and for all time. This means that advancing
conceptions of the good for public life is inevitably cast as conflict,
a conflict that must be circumvented through a claimed alternative
mode of discourse, such as Rawls’s public reason.52 Political
argument must, Gedicks concludes, turn to a discourse of rights
in which the “neutral” state facilitates self-determination.53 Others
have suggested that this line of argument renders public discourse
shallow and thinned-out, or else does violence to a person’s
convictions.54 Perhaps most importantly, it may rob us of
something desirable: a truer, more complete understanding of how
we want to live well together in society.55 Indeed, given the typical
content of thick, theologically informed claims as to dignity or
conscience, it is strange to refer to such claims as constituting
repression.56 That argument appears to depend on the contention
51. Id. at 1262.
52. See generally KRISTEN DEEDE JOHNSON, THEOLOGY, POLITICAL THEORY, AND
PLURALISM: BEYOND TOLERANCE AND DIFFERENCE (2007). Deede Johnson argues that “within
political liberalism, as articulated by Rawls, difference is seen as a fact or problem to be dealt
with,” notably by demanding unity in public reason. Id. at 2. She continues:
[T]he entire point of his theory is to find conceptions of justice upon which all
people can agree, that form the basis of a consensus, so that disagreement and
dissensus can be kept out of the political realm. Not even the principles of justice
themselves are the result of dialogue . . . .
Id. at 63. John Perry similarly argues that thinkers from John Locke to John Rawls
demonstrate “a deep distrust of the give-and-take of political debate.” John Perry, Arguing
Out of Bounds: Christian Eloquence and the End of Johannine Liberalism, in RELIGION IN A LIBERAL
STATE 219, 225 (Gavin D’Costa, Malcolm Evans, Tariq Modood & Julian Rivers eds., 2013).
53. See Gedicks, supra note 41, at 1269.
54. See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE 39 (2010)
(arguing that the demand for secular vocabulary—like public reason—leaves us unable to
“fully own up to . . . our real commitments,” ensuring that “our discourse will often be
barren, unsatisfying, and shallow”).
55. I take this as a significant apologetic claim within Christian thought. See, e.g.,
JOHN MILBANK & ADRIAN PABST, THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE: POST-LIBERALISM AND THE HUMAN
FUTURE 4 (2016) (arguing that the question of what shape an individual life should take, its
character, is only comprehensible when we also ask “what sort of society all of us want”).
56. Take discussion of dignity in Christian thought. Pope Francis refers to the
“transcendent dignity” of the person. This means that each person is understood to be
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that a judgement exercised against a person’s sense of authenticity,
or what Rawls called self-respect, for example, is necessarily
harmful if the judgement arises from another comprehensive
conception of the good.57 But self-respect is not hindered by true
claims; pointing to what is truly desirable for a person and a
community (which is of course open to debate) is not unjust simply
because what is truly desirable is critical of some choices.58 As
discussed, the inter-subjective view of conscience is fundamentally
social in orientation, meaning it is linked with ideas of solidarity,
fraternity, and love as the true character of conscience claims. This
may not be accepted by all, but it may nevertheless pose something
deeply attractive and capable of persuading many.
Nor is pluralism necessarily complete or conflictual, even in the
absence of persuasion. Gedicks refers to different religious groups
being alienated by a Christian conception of the good for a political
community, but this is debatable. It is not uncommon that persons
of different faiths support acknowledging Christian claims as
central to public life, in contexts where this is traditionally taken to
be the case, precisely because this gives voice to the very idea that
there is a religious end to our individual and collective endeavors.59
Indeed, although Gedicks points to non-Christians rejecting
desired and needed in our common life. Before the European Parliament in 2014, he
argued that such a vision of dignity stands against “selfish lifestyles . . . indifferent to the
world around us, and especially the poorest of the poor.” Pope Francis, Address of
Pope Francis to the European Parliament, VATICAN (Nov. 25, 2014), https://w2.vatican.va/
content/francesco/en/speeches/2014/november/documents/papa-francesco_20141125_
strasburgo-parlamento-europeo.html. Dignity means, he states elsewhere, “form[ing] a
community composed of brothers and sisters who accept and care for one another.” Pope
Francis, Message of His Holiness Francis for the Celebration of the World Day of Peace: Fraternity,
the Foundation and Pathway to Peace, VATICAN (Jan. 1, 2014), http://w2.vatican.va/
content/francesco/en/messages/peace/documents/papa-francesco_20131208_messaggioxlvii-giornata-mondiale-pace-2014.html; see also JEREMY WALDRON, ONE ANOTHER’S EQUALS:
THE BASIS OF HUMAN EQUALITY 204–05 (2017) (discussing dignity, understood religiously, as
“a special story or trajectory or range of narrative possibilities that apply to each person.
Each person is seen as the recipient of a high calling, a possible subject of faith, a subject and
object of love, and a subject of penitence and object of redemption”).
57. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 45, at 318.
58. See John Finnis, On the Practical Meaning of Secularism, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 491,
507–09 (1998).
59. See Tariq Modood, Introduction: Establishment, Reform and Multiculturalism, in
CHURCH, STATE AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES 4 (Tariq Modood ed., 1997) (arguing that
minorities value the establishment of the Church of England as “ongoing recognition of the
public character of religion” against any “triumphal secularism”); JONATHAN SACKS, THE
PERSISTENCE OF FAITH: RELIGION, MORALITY AND SOCIETY IN A SECULAR AGE 68 (1991)
(arguing that establishment includes representing shared values).
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Christian claims, it is not at all clear that all of these groups would
typically opt for “a set of largely instrumental rights oriented to
self-realization” as the central constitutive commitment of a
political community.60 Many are quite likely to see this simply as
an alternative vision of the good life for the political community,
and one inimical to a truer or richer understanding of community
with others. Such a central constitutive commitment cannot be
avoided. A commitment to fraternity and love (as Francis
advocates)61 will draw boundaries on what is permissible and not
permissible, just as a commitment to personal autonomy will.
Nevertheless, those advancing the inter-subjective view of
conscience typically still emphasize recognizing the claims of
others within this central commitment. A Christian argument—like
the inter-subjective view of conscience—can recognize difference.
For example, Milbank argues that toleration and even mutual
respect can be grounded on the Christian claim that those who err
should be treated with love and patience, and that there will always
remain an apophatic sense of our own limited perspective.62 This
can be coupled with what Pope Francis calls “healthy pluralism.”63
Francis gives the image of society as a polyhedron rather than a
sphere. Whereas the sphere reflects the demand for uniformity—
each point is exactly the same as another—a polyhedron points to
different groups and persons with their own specific differences
(the planes) that nevertheless contribute to shared ends (the
connected shape).64 Drawn out further in the context of conscience
claims, the argument reflects two contentions. First, that conscience
pursues a substantive end—love of God that necessarily manifests
as fraternity and charity, for example. Second, that this substantive
end can be generously understood as respecting analogous or
different responses to the urgings of conscience that seek to forge, for

60. Gedicks, supra note 41, at 1268.
61. POPE FRANCIS, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: FRATELLI TUTTI ON FRATERNITY AND SOCIAL
FRIENDSHIP (2020), http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/
papa-francesco_20201003_enciclica-fratelli-tutti.html. See generally Harrison, supra note 39,
473–74 (arguing that Francis understands religious liberty as necessarily directed towards
fraternity and charity).
62. John Milbank, The Decline of Religious Freedom and the Return of Religious Influence, in
RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE: NEW CONVERSATIONS 26, 33 (James Walters & Esther Kersley
eds., 2018).
63. See POPE FRANCIS, EVANGELII GAUDIUM, supra note 37, § 255.
64. See id. at §§ 236, 255.
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example, a right relationship with God.65 Indeed, the inter-subjective
view of conscience argues that the very possibility of such respect
for analogous responses arises from the commitment to a
substantive end that lies at the heart of the inter-subjective
understanding. Conscientious objection to war is a clear example.
Even a society that demands citizens kill in its name, seemingly
rejecting a renunciation of war, can nevertheless recognize the
claim of the conscientious objector as reflecting something good—
the sanctity of life, the primacy of peace—that is commonly shared
and perhaps even persuasive.
III. ETHICAL FREEDOM CONSCIENCE
The inter-subjective understanding of conscience is not the only
understanding present within Christian religious liberty discourse.
Gedicks’ emphasis on self-determination as central to human
dignity is echoed in what I am calling the ethical freedom
understanding of conscience. On this understanding, conscience
ultimately concerns the individual’s development of authenticity;
it is the individual who is able to define what conscience is directed
towards and what are its demands. This arises through abstraction.
The inter-subjective view is rooted in a claim as to conscience’s
shared end. It points ultimately to God, and God with a particular
character. In contrast, the ethical freedom understanding, through
an increasing focus on the individual, frames conscience as
covering a multitude of possible ends. I will critically suggest this
creates a boundary question: Is it possible to delineate what counts
as a claim of conscience? I will then conclude by examining how the
ethical freedom view of conscience is embedded within an
understanding of the role of political authority different from the
inter-subjective view of conscience.
A. Conscience Abstracted
Wilken continues his tracing of the “Christian origins of
religious freedom” through an extended discussion of the
Reformers, leading then to an epilogue on James Madison and an

65. See generally, HARRISON, supra note 3, at 59–99 (discussing respecting pluralism
and disagreement when religious liberty is framed by substantive ends). This contrasts an
understanding that the state must remain neutral as between claims of conscience, creating
a “moral marketplace.” See VISCHER, supra note 31, at 4–5.
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appendix on Thomas Jefferson.66 In this ascending Whig view, there
is an increasing emphasis on the individual exercising what Wilken
calls “a sphere of choice.”67 It comes to fruition in Madison’s
Memorial and Remonstrance. Madison famously argued for religious
liberty based on the “duty of every man to render to the Creator
such homage, and such only, as he believes acceptable to him.”68
“The religion . . . of every man,” he contended, “must be left to the
conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every
man to exercise it as these may dictate.”69 As with the first view of
conscience, conscience here demands consent in any act of worship,
against coercion into the faith. But Madison’s appeals to
conscience—and Wilken’s overarching argument that this
recapitulates a “sphere of choice”—may also reflect a more radical
thought: it is the individual who determines what God is
commanding, the individual who can act “as believes acceptable to
him.”70 This then precipitates a slide towards an even more
capacious argument: that political authorities must respect ethical
freedom more generally. For this reason, I call this second account
of conscience ethical freedom conscience.
Kathleen Brady’s attempt to rehabilitate the Madisonian line of
argument illustrates the trajectory, and the difficulties this poses.71
Brady discusses the increasing skepticism over religion’s claim
to special or particular treatment, expressed in arguments for
fairness or equality between convictions, including non-religious
convictions. In response, she restates what she calls an “American
66. WILKEN, supra note 20, at 184, 189.
67. Id. at 110–11.
68. JAMES MADISON, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE 5–6
(1819). Written in 1785, Madison’s complete Memorial and Remonstrance can also be found as
an appendix to Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 63 (1947) (Rutledge J., dissenting).
69. MADISON, supra note 68, at 5.
70. Indeed, the thought may go a step further, as it arguably did for John Locke and
certainly did for Thomas Jefferson: what ultimately matters, what God accepts, is sincerity
regardless of belief. See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 38 (J.H. Tully ed.,
1983) (1689) (“Faith only, and inward Sincerity, are the things that procure acceptance with
God . . . no Religion, which I believe not to be true, can be either true, or profitable unto
me.”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 256, 261 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903) (quoted in BRADY, supra note 7,
at 104 (“[We] are answerable, not for the rightness, but uprightness of [our] decision[s].”)).
71. She is not alone in appealing to a Madisonian tradition. See also Nicholas Wolterstorff,
A Religious Argument for the Civil Right to Freedom of Religious Exercise, Drawn from American
History, in UNDERSTANDING LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 329
(Terence Cuneo ed., 2012); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious
Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159 (2013).
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self-understanding.”72 Appealing to the founders of American
constitutionalism, she argues that there is a common
understanding of religion which is, or should be, compelling to all
persons. Madison is again a key figure. Brady appeals to his claim
of conscientious duty to render to the Creator only that which the
person believes is acceptable. She sees this as encapsulating (or
perhaps better, bringing to fruition) the character of natural
religion73 or what she refers to as “religious conscience.”74 On her
argument, this is distinguishable from secular conscience. That
distinction turns on how she understands religion.
Religion, she argues, is a transcultural and transhistorical
phenomenon, a category that, once defined, covers all particular
instances of what we may commonly think of as religion. It “grows
out of common human experience.”75 Brady attempts to capture
what exactly this common experience is. At times, her articulation
of natural religion takes on more explicitly Christian (or at least
Abrahamic) overtones. She refers to the experience of creatureliness,
authorship in the cosmos, and then communion with the divine,
through which the believer “shares in the divine life”—”[t]he
believer’s finitude is taken up into the infinite.”76 On occasion,
Brady alludes to the transcendent, but given the definition is
intended to cover non-transcendental religions, and her concern to
avoid sectarianism, this cannot be definitive.77 More generally,
however, she frames religion as a category that refers to “being
in a relationship to a greater Reality that grounds and defines
all that is.”78 This “greater Reality” may otherwise be known as
“the Absolute, Being Itself, the Infinite, the Holy, the Ultimate,
Ultimate Reality or Power, the Mystery of all existence.”79 It is a
“communion” that leads to “salvation or liberation of fulfilment.”80
For Brady, then, religious conscience, entailing the individual’s

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
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Id. at 80–99.
See, e.g., id. at 23.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 82–84.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 90.
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response to this ultimate, should be afforded special protection or
accommodation at law.81
But does this encapsulate a natural category of “religion” or
“religious conscience”? Brady wants this to be the case because she
does not want to rest on “controversial theological premises” that
“lack persuasive force in an increasingly secular society.”82 She
acknowledges that her view of natural religion, and the conscience
that responds to it, is fundamentally individualistic.83 She appears
to think that this is “inescapable.”84 Why it is inescapable is not
clear. For example, for some Christians, certainly historically, the
formation of a body of people—the Church or the populus
christianus—is foundational.85 More likely, such individualism is
fundamental to a specific American tradition of religious liberty—
the tradition Brady explicitly draws from, while claiming it reflects
something natural—or else extends upon a specific modern
understanding of religion.86 Within Brady’s set of terms can be
found the Madisonian divine, elements of Romanticism and the
rejection of rationalism, cosmotheism, the metaphysics of absolute
spirit, and an appeal to Christian existentialism. This lineage,
leading to the modern claim as to what “religion” encapsulates, is
typified by two features: an increasing individualization reinforced
by an increasing level of abstraction.87 As Graham Ward argues, it
81. See id. at 120–21 (“At the heart of the founding era protections for the rights of
conscience was a respect for conscience, the unique and uniquely important relationship that
grounds it and gives it special dignity, and the claim that conscience and its demands make
on believers, and the efforts of believers to heed these demands as they see them. This respect
for conscience remains a powerful value today.”).
82. Id. at 69.
83. She writes, “We must begin with the individual, and, indeed, we must end there
as well.” Id. at 9.
84. Id. at 159.
85. See, e.g., BRAD S. GREGORY, THE UNINTENDED REFORMATION: HOW A RELIGIOUS
REVOLUTION SECULARIZED SOCIETY 215 (2012); HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION:
THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 91 (1983). Individualism here refers
to the end at stake—an individual’s self-determination, for example. However, what
exactly the individual alights upon does not spring simply from the depths of a person. As I
discuss below, this understanding of natural religion or religious conscience contributes
to characterizing consumption as a religious act. Such consumption is not simply a matter
of private choice, but the structuring of an economy, the marketing of desire, and what
Charles Taylor calls “mutual displays of identity.” TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 483. Claims of
religious conscience are never removed from social interactions, even when the individual’s
ultimate concern is taken to be their end.
86. BRADY, supra note 7, at 208.
87. See GRAHAM WARD, TRUE RELIGION 73–133 (2003). Ward characterizes Tillich’s
“ultimate” as part of an “evacuation of expression.” Id. at 117–20.
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reflects attempts within Christian thought to reconceive specific
traditions as pursuits of some hidden, or greater, “infinite” or
“ultimate,” rendering their specificity irrelevant. Notably, this
includes Paul Tillich’s understanding of “the ultimate,” which
Brady appeals to.88 Tillich famously characterized religion as the
individual’s experience of a “depth” of “ultimate concern.”89
But such abstraction privileges the individual: all instances of “the
ultimate” are fundamentally the subject of individual determination.
Madison’s individual determining a response to a divine is, on this
account, one beginning.90
Given this, an appeal to the conscience responding to its own
understanding of the ultimate is likely to raise a boundary concern.
What falls into this seemingly increasingly expansive category?
Brady recognizes this concern.91 However, she wishes to maintain
a distinction between “religious and nonreligious beliefs” or
“religious conscience” and “secular conscience.”92 The former
includes individualists who shop around for religious experiences
and new religious movements. These individuals and movements
are characterized as still seeking “meaning through a genuine
connection or relationship with the higher power or powers.”93
In itself, it could be asked whether conscience should be afforded
special concern when it concerns such consumer expression. This is

88. BRADY, supra note 7, at 103.
89. PAUL TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 63–64 (1962).
90. See also GREGORY, supra note 85, at 167–71 (on Madison constructing “individual
conscience as an autonomous and inviolable court”), 215 (on the development of radical
Protestant claims). I emphasize that Madison is a beginning, meaning his claims no doubt rest
on prior movements towards the individual. For example, in this volume, Nicholas Aroney
discusses how understandings of human dignity were flattened out—shifting from a social
vision of role, virtue, community, and assumption into Christ to an understanding of
self-determination or autonomy. Aroney focuses on Kant as central. See Nicholas Aroney,
The Rise and Fall of Human Dignity 46 BYU L. REV. 1211 (2021). Vischer points to Locke’s
understanding of conscience “as formed experientially” as “dominant” today. VISCHER, supra
note 31, at 60. Although Vischer sees Locke’s argument as still referring to moral sources
outside of the person, he argues it contributes to “the modern tendency to treat conscience
as an idiosyncratic question of taste or preference, rather than an objective, or even accessible,
source of moral insight.” Id. My discussion in this part of the article echoes Charles Taylor’s
genealogy, in which a covenanting God establishing human order by divine command gives
way to the internal development of ethical rules and then, finally, the individual’s own sense
of authenticity. TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 221–95 (“The Turning Point”), 473–504 (“The Age
of Authenticity”).
91. See, e.g., BRADY, supra note 7, at 207.
92. See, e.g., id. at 143.
93. Id. at 209.
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significantly removed from the social ends (and judgement) of the
first account. But Brady also wants to maintain a boundary between
such expression that is truly seeking a religious connection and that
which is not. It is not clear where that boundary lies, once this
expansion has been accepted. Indeed, as others have argued, the
contemporary understanding of religion is as likely to be
manifested in consumer experiences more generally.94 This
includes practices self-consciously seen as spiritual endeavors (like
wellness consumption)95 and religious traditions reconceived in
market terms, both of which Brady accepts as instances of religious
conscience, but also simply the very act of consumption itself.
Individuals now seek—and have marketed to them—an apparent
infinite variety of commodities and consumed experiences
appealing to a sense of depth, immersion, a claim of ultimacy, or
even transcendence.96
This is a dilemma found in religious liberty discourse more
generally.
Within case law, the movement from conscience as the
individual following God’s commands towards a more capacious
understanding of personal autonomy is likely to be seen as natural.
For example, Justice Dickson of the Supreme Court of Canada
explicitly traced the underlying justification for religious liberty in
precisely these terms. He stated the liberty arose historically from a
concern for those in post-Reformation Europe who found
themselves subject to a ruler who attempted to enforce a different
faith—a concern to prevent coercion. He then contended that this
shifted to a focus on an underlying “reality of individual
conscience” planted by God. But this new emphasis precipitated,
he concluded, the contemporary position, in which religious liberty
concerns the centrality of individual judgement—personal

94. See, e.g., WARD, supra note 87, at 114–53; William T. Cavanaugh, Return of the Golden
Calf: Economy, Idolatry, and Secularization since Gaudium et Spes, 76 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 698
(2015); JAMES K. A. SMITH, DESIRING THE KINGDOM: WORSHIP, WORLDVIEW, AND CULTURAL
FORMATION 96 (2009). For example, Cavanaugh writes, “The people standing ready to burst
into Best Buy at midnight on Thanksgiving are not disenchanted.” Id. at 715. This can be
contrasted with Brady’s claim (referring to new spiritualities) that “there are simply not a lot
of Americans who belong to nontraditional faiths.” BRADY, supra note 7, at 210.
95. See COURTNEY BENDER, THE NEW METAPHYSICALS: SPIRITUALITY AND THE AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS IMAGINATION (2010).
96. See HARRISON, supra note 3, at 81–86, for further discussion. D. Stephen Long refers
to “non-confessional theology” contributing to the “contentless character of global
capitalism.” D. STEPHEN LONG, DIVINE ECONOMY: THEOLOGY AND THE MARKET 55 (2000).
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autonomy—as the foundation of human dignity and the concern of
political authority.97
Such a line of development, moving from God’s commands to
a conception of ethical freedom, is then developed in prominent
theories of religious liberty. Martha Nussbaum argues that religious
liberty is designed to protect what she calls the “faculty with which
each person searches for the ultimate meaning of life.” This is
consciously capacious; it does not purport to judge what answer
the individual finds or “the question whether there is a meaning to
be found” at all.98 Similarly, Charles Taylor and Jocelyn Maclure
argue that in a society of plural beliefs, political authority should
respect “convictions of conscience.”99 The subsequent question is
whether this capacious category should be afforded any special
protection when it conflicts with general laws. As with Brady,
theorists typically do not go so far as raising whether the pursuit of
an ultimate is manifested in consumer practices. Indeed,
Nussbaum, as well as Maclure and Taylor, attempt to rule out for
special treatment beliefs or practices that are “frivolous”
(Nussbaum) or “expensive taste” (Taylor and Maclure).100 Such
distinctions arguably import an assessment of such claims, beyond
the focus on individual subjectivity that typifies these accounts.
For this reason, Dworkin comes closest to following the logic
of the argument through to a more thoroughgoing relativization,
in which conscience covers a multitude of individual acts of
self-determination or even consumption. His account of religious
liberty ends by conflating the theist (typically associated with a
voluntarist God) and the atheist, so long as each is conscientiously
pursuing a life that “grips” him or her, especially through choices
that can be characterized as particularly “intimate.”101 In doing so,
he appeals to an evolving understanding of what religion is.
For him, Tillich also acts as a fulcrum figure who expressed the
logic of shifting towards the individual as the spiritual center of
gravity.102 Religion for Dworkin consequently concerns pursuing
97. R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, paras. 118–25 (Can.).
98. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 168–69 (2008).
99. See MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 13.
100. NUSSBAUM, supra note 98, at 168–69; MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 69–80.
101. See DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD, supra note 4, at 122; DWORKIN, IS
DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?, supra note 4, at 73.
102. DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD, supra note 4, at 37.
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an understanding that there is value to be found in the world, and
the responsibility to make one’s life a success.103 Religious liberty is
to serve this—it protects ethical freedom or independence.104
But this means, he continues, that religious traditions should not be
singled out for accommodations when faced with neutral laws
regulating conduct. Doing so would let “eccentricity” undermine
government regulation. There is, he argues, no way to differentiate
between the hedonist, the drug-loving libertarian, and the
sacramentalist.105 All fall under a general right to ethical freedom
or independence.106
B. Ethical Freedom Conscience and Political Authority
Neither the inter-subjective view of conscience nor the ethical
freedom view of conscience concern simply “conscience” as one
important value. Each contributes to shaping an understanding of
the purpose of political authority and the ends of political
community. Brady is again clear on this. She acknowledges the
potential proliferation of conscience-claims encapsulated in the
individualistic and abstracted account of religious conscience. But
this is seen as foundational to an understanding of the domain of
political authority and what it should protect.
Brady raises the claim, common to American constitutionalism,
that cultivating factional difference—a thousand flowers blooming,
with roots potentially located in each individual—means that no
single group can claim the reins of power.107 Such factional
difference is a core feature, on this account, of good, limited
government. This is coupled with the claim that civil authority is,
seemingly by its nature, not competent to judge questions of
religious truth. Doing so is left to the individual, as the locus of
religious truth.108 Others have argued similarly. Wilken sees such
claims as foundational to Reformed thought (and its fruition in
103. Id. at 10.
104. Id. at 132; DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?, supra note 4, at 61.
105. DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD, supra note 4, at 124–25, 135.
106. Dworkin does not consider that all instances of “religion,” so understood, should
be afforded a special right. That would be unworkable, he argues. Rather, all of these are
protected by a general freedom (ethical independence) limiting the reasons for government
action: “[G]overnment must never restrict freedom just because it assumes that one way for
people to live their lives—one idea about what lives are most worth living just in
themselves—is intrinsically better than another.” Id. at 130.
107. BRADY, supra note 7, at 144–45.
108. Id. at 123–24.
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American constitutionalism). Between John Calvin and Roger
Williams, for example, there is a common claim of differentiation:
civil authority is tasked simply with civil peace, and the outward
behavior necessary for this, in distinction to the freedom of the soul,
accountable to God alone.109 Nicholas Wolterstorff continues in this
vein. He argues that political authority cannot be concerned with
inculcating virtue, including true religion. It must secure “the
excellence of being free.”110 He then aligns this argument for the
limited role of government with John Locke’s appeal to subjective
rights: an individual has “a property in his own person.”111 As
Steven Smith notes, “the spiritual center of gravity” shifts towards
the individual,112 individuals whose multitude of ultimate concerns
can be facilitated or supported by a now secular state. Claims of this
kind, reflecting the ethical freedom of the individual to determine
such ultimate concerns or what grips him or her, need not relate to
an understanding of the ends of the community beyond facilitating
such expressions. John Perry critically calls this “the individual’s
sovereignty over the moral world.”113
IV. CONCLUSION
Compared to its pre-modern usage, translated by some authors
into a contemporary vein, the ethical freedom understanding of

109. WILKEN, supra note 20, at 68–70 (on John Calvin), 147–49 (on Roger Williams).
110. NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, Do Christians Have Good Reasons for Supporting Liberal
Democracy?, in UNDERSTANDING LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 305,
320 (Terrence Cuneo ed., 2012). For Wolterstorff, this freedom concerns the inherent dignity
and equal worth of individuals that must not be violated. For a discussion of Wolterstorff’s
arguments in the context of religious liberty, see HARRISON, supra note 3, at 130–40.
111. WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 110, at 322; see JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL EXTENT, AND END OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT 128 (Mark Goldie ed., Everyman Press 1993) (1690).
112. See Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122
HARV. L. REV. 1869, 1878 (2009) (reviewing 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS (2008)). At the same time, these theories reflect
the rise of state power. It is the state that is now characterized as having control over the
body, what Calvin identified with safety, housing, food, and the law as the “needs of the
present life,” for example. See WILKEN, supra note 20, at 68. As Gregory notes, in identifying
a distinct sphere of conscience for religion, the Reformers also justified a more complete
regulation of the person by the state. See GREGORY, supra note 85, at 147–48.
113. John Perry, Two Questions for Wolterstorff: On the Roles Played by Rights-Talk in History
and the Measuring of Worth, 23 STUD. CHRISTIAN ETHICS 147, 149–51 (2010). He continues: “I
can claim a right to religious freedom even while denying (or being agnostic on) worship of
God as a true human good.” Id. at 151.
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conscience is “truncated” or “distorted.”114 On the inter-subjective
view of conscience, still present in Christian religious liberty
discourse, the person has a duty to pursue God as one’s own end.
This entailed forming a community—conscience was not simply an
act of the individual, but it was directed to social ends. Conscience,
in other words, is exercised in aid of a flourishing community. Such
flourishing is found in a common good or end, in which different
talents and roles are creatively reconciled. The inter-subjective view
of conscience consequently is embedded within a different
understanding of the role of political authority. Political authority
is tasked with supporting this true end. It concerns itself with
cultivating a community that “live[s] well,” to borrow from
Aquinas, or that exists for “communion and fellowship with
others,” as Richard Hooker argued.115 I have discussed this
elsewhere as fraternity, solidarity, and charity.116 That further means
that the inter-subjective view of conscience rejects the claim that
political authority is simply incompetent in matters of religion.
Rather, in situations of conflict or tension, when a conscientious
claim is raised, political authority must determine whether this
is a true act of conscience (generously understood), whether it
contributes to or is consistent with “living well.”
This does not mean that political authority can coerce a person
into the faith. To the contrary. Here, we find broad agreement
across different strands of Christian religious liberty discourse
against coercion. But the inter-subjective view frames this in terms
of a true understanding of religious ends—the free offering of the
person to God. The duty not to coerce a person derives from, on
this account, the duty political authorities have to be attentive to
the pursuit of this true understanding of religion. In contrast, the
ethical freedom view of conscience sees coercion as contrary to the
“sphere of choice” that it is the task of political authority to protect
and further.
A final question remains. At the outset of this Article, I raised
whether religion or religious conscience, to adopt Brady’s term, is
becoming equally subject to the state’s law, or else most likely
114. Ahdar, supra note 30, at 131.
115. Thomas Aquinas, On Kingship or The Governance of Rulers (De Regimine Principum,
1265-1267), in ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS 14, 27, 29 (Paul E. Sigmund ed.
& trans., 1988); RICHARD HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY 87 (Arthur Stephen
McGrade ed., 1989).
116. See HARRISON, supra note 3, 142–82 (“The Ecclesiological Account”).
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outweighed by the significant interests proposed by the law. In
part, this outcome is generated by the movement towards
abstracting religion and conscience into an increasingly capacious
category of the individual’s relationship to some “ultimate.”
Conscience as a category of special concern is undermined.
It becomes political authority supporting ethical freedom, or a
“sphere of choice,” leaving the inter-subjective view of conscience
as just one possible outlook. But what if conscience is grounded in
a specific tradition—reflecting a shared end in God, necessitating
persons forming a community with a particular shape, however
partially understood and debated? Rather than flattening claims of
conscience through an abstraction—all are equally included, but all
are equally subject to the law—holding to a concrete tradition is,
I have suggested, more likely to ground a special respect for
conscience, even analogous pursuits of a shared end.
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